MULTICULTURAL GOVERNANCE
IN A MOBILE WORLD

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Reimagining the Nation, Migration and Citizenship: The Role of Cultural Institutions and New Institutional Responses

Peggy Levitt

1. Introduction

During the summer of 2016, musician Paul Simon sat down with a writer from *The New Yorker* magazine to talk about craft. He described the session in which he recorded his Grammy-winning album, *Graceland*. The day before, an accordionist and percussionist had laid down a track. Although he liked the drum line, he did not like what the accordionist had done, so he asked a guitarist to take another pass. The guitarist said that the drum solo reminded him of American country music (which is why, Simon remarks, that he probably liked it too). As the guitarist began to play, he suddenly switched from a major to a minor chord, a move that, according to Simon, is very rare in South African music. ‘Why did you do that?’ Simon asked. Because he had heard Simon play those chords before, he replied. ‘So here’s Ray’, recalls Simon, ‘who is playing what he thinks is American country and adding a chord structure that he knows from his music to a beat that came from an accordion track that has nothing to do with this and then when he gets to the chorus he goes into a kind of African blues ... so what we have here really is world music, it’s really people doing what they heard and vaguely remember and trying to imitate what it was’ (*The New Yorker* 2016).

I begin this meditation on cultural pluralism in our mobile world with this anecdote because it speaks to the part of our scholarly conversation that so often gets left out. The fact that culture migrates along with people to produce world music, world literature and the like means that culture both reflects and is part of the toolkit we have to respond to the fundamental changes in social and political life that migration brings about. The move from national music to world music or, more generally, from national culture to global culture mirrors and contributes to an understanding of the world as a place, where by choice or by force, with great success or great struggle, permanent impermanence is the rule rather than the exception. If the object of this volume is to reconsider citizenship, integration and diversity in this context, then we need to understand how and where it becomes possible to imagine these categories differently. We also need to understand how and where we create different kinds of social institutions which better reflect this changing world on the move.

2. Permanent impermanence

The world is in the throes of a terrible refugee crisis. According to the UNHCR (2015), in 2014 there were almost sixty million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) around the globe – approximately one in every 122 people. That is roughly the equivalent of all Italians being forced to leave their homes. It does not include the many Syrian refugees who flee each day (UNIS 2014).

Forced migration is just one category of movement on the rise. In 2014, William Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration, reported that in addition to the 214 million international migrants, there are an estimated 740 million internal migrants (IOM 2015). That means that nearly one billion people (or roughly one out of every seven people) are moving within or beyond their nations, either voluntarily or by force. These individuals are increasingly moving within the global south. When they do move north or westward, they encounter countries in demographic decline, where the numbers of retired workers in need of care and a pension are greater than the working-aged population, and where large numbers of redundant workers cannot find well-paying, steady employment at the same time that social welfare entitlements are shrinking.

Many of these migrants continue to remain active in the economics, politics and social life of their homelands. They vote, invest in businesses and participate in civic associations in their countries-of-origin at the same time that they buy homes, open stores and
JOIN COMMUNITY GROUPS IN THE PLACES WHERE THEY SETTLE. FOR SOME MIGRANTS, LIVING ACROSS BORDERS Comes easily. THEY HAVE THE EDUCATION, SKILLS AND SOCIAL CONTACTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES ANYWHERE. MANY MORE ARE FORCED INTO TRANSNATIONAL LIVES BECAUSE THEY CANNOT Gain A SECURE FOOTHOLD BACK HOME OR WHERE THEY MOVE.

THese DYNAMICS CHALLENGE LONG-STANDING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HOW PEOPLE LIVE - HOW AND WHERE THEY RAISE THEIR FAMILIES; HOW LIVELIHOODS ARE EARNED; HOW RACE, CLASS AND GENDER ARE CONSTITUTED; AND WHERE THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP GET FULFILLED. BUT MOST PEOPLE STILL BELIEVE, AND MOST SOCIAL WELFARE INSTITUTIONS ARE STILL ORGANIZED, AS IF THE NATION-STATE IS THE LOGICAL CONTAINER WITHIN WHICH SOCIAL LIFE IS ORGANIZED. THEY TAKE STASIS, ROOTEDNESS AND CITIZENSHIP AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL FOR GRANTED WHILE, AS THE CHAPTERS IN THIS VOLUME DEMONSTRATE, MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE LONG-TERM RESIDENTS WITHOUT FULL RIGHTS. INCREASINGLY, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE AND CITIZEN IS NATIONAL, BUT PEOPLE'S LIVES ARE NOT.

SO HOW, WHERE AND FOR WHOM IS THE CULTURAL WORK BEING DONE THAT ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND THE WORLD DIFFERENTLY - TO SHIFT OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM PERMANENT SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION INTO BOUNDED NATION STATES TO ONE IN WHICH MobilE PEOPLE, WITH VARYING LEVELS OF MEMBERSHIP IN AND PROTECTION BY HOME, HOST AND SUPRANATIONAL INSITUTIONS, IDENTIFY WITH SEVERAL PLACES AT ONCE? WHO ARE THE NEW WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THIS CHANGING PANORAMA? IN THE FIRST PART OF THIS CHAPTER, I EXPLORE HOW ONE TYPE OF CULTURAL INSTITUTION - MUSEUMS - ARE RESPONDING TO IMMIGRATION AND GLOBALISATION AROUND THE WORLD. I ASK IF AND HOW THEY ARE CHANGING NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, NATIONHOOD AND PLURALISM. THE SECOND HALF OF THE CHAPTER LOOKS AT NEW FORMS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION THAT ARE ARISING IN RESPONSE TO HEIGHTENED MOBILITY AND PERMANENT IMPERMANENCE.

3. MUSEUMS AND THE COSMOPOLITAN-NATIONAL CONTINUUM

BENEDICT ANDERSON (1983) DESCRIBED NATIONS AS IMAGINED POLITICAL COMMUNITIES, BASED ON 'A DEEP, HORIZONTAL COMRADESHIP': A 'FRATERNITY' THAT IS SO COMPELLING IT CAN INSPIRE MEMBERS TO DIE FOR ITS CAUSE. CULTURE PLAYS A STARRING ROLE IN HIS ARGUMENT. ALONG WITH CAPITALISM, PRINT TECHNOLOGIES AND VERNACULAR LANGUAGES, HE ALSO CREDITS MUSEUMS WITH CREATING NATIONS AND NATIONAL CITIZENS BY FORGING UNIFIED 'TEAMS' OUT OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO RECOGNISE THEMSELVES IN THE SHARED CUSTOMS, KNOWLEDGE AND TRADITIONS ON DISPLAY.

BUT, IN TODAY'S GLOBAL, MOBILE WORLD, WHAT KINDS OF CITIZENS ARE MUSEUMS CREATING? UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DO THEY HELP VISITORS IMAGINE A DIFFERENT KIND OF NATION AND DIFFERENT KINDS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS BOTH WITHIN AND BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS?

TO FIND ANSWERS, I VISITED MUSEUMS IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (LEVITT 2015). I TALKED WITH MUSEUM DIRECTORS, CURATORS AND POLICYMAKERS ABOUT CURRENT AND FUTURE EXHIBITIONS AND COLLECTED THEIR STORIES ABOUT THE PAINTINGS, ICONIC OBJECTS AND BENEFACtORS THAT DEFINE THEIR COLLECTIONS. IN THE UNITED STATES, I COMPARE MUSEUMS IN ALLEGEDLY PAROCHIAL BOSTON WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE SO-CALLED CENTRE OF THE NATIONAL CULTURAL UNIVERSE, NEW YORK. IN EUROPE, I FOCUS ON COPENHAGEN, GOTHENBURG AND STOCKHOLM, FORMER BASTIONS OF TOLERANCE WHICH HAVE BECOME, TO VARYING DEGREES, HORTHEMS OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT. I THEN ASK IF MUSEUMS IN SINGAPORE AND DOHA CREATE ASIAN OR MUSLIM GLOBAL CITIZENS. HOW DOES THE TENSION BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND NATIONALISM PLAY OUT OUTSIDE THE WEST?

NO MUSEUM I VISITED TOLD AN ENTIRELY NATIONAL OR GLOBAL STORY. INSTEAD, THE NATION ALWAYS REARED ITS HEAD IN DEPICTIONS OF THE COSMOPOLITAN, AND COSMOPOLITANISM ALWAYS CAME WITH SOMETHING OF THE NATIONAL. RATHER THAN SEEING THESE AS COMPETING, I THINK OF CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AS FALLING ALONG A CONTINUUM OF COSMOPOLITAN-NATIONALISM WHOSE TWO CONSTANTLY CHANGING PARTS MUTUALLY INFORM AND TRANSFORM EACH OTHER.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE VARIATIONS I DISCOVERED IN HOW MUSEUMS COMBINE NATIONAL AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP CREATION HAVE TO DO WITH THEIR HISTORIES, FUNDING, COLLECTIONS AND THEIR CURATORIAL EXPERTISE. THEY HAVE TO DO WITH WHETHER THEY ARE PUBLIC OR PRIVATELY FUNDED AND WITH THEIR SCOPE - WHETHER THEY BEGAN LIFE AS MUSEUMS OF ART OR ARTIFACTS COLLECTED BY COLONISERS TO DISPLAY THEIR SUPERIOR POWER. BUT THEY ALSO HAVE TO DO WITH: (1) A CITY'S CULTURAL ARMATURE AND, IN PARTICULAR, ITS DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT REGIME; (2) ITS POSITION IN THE GLOBAL CULTURAL HIERARCHY AND, THEREFORE, HOW MUCH IT INFLUENCES AND IS INFLUENCED BY GLOBAL MUSEUM ASSEMBLAGES; AND (3) WHERE THE NATION IS IN THE ARC OF ITS NATION-BUILDING AND WORLD-CLAIMING PROJECTS. LET ME DISCUSS EACH IN TURN.

WHERE MUSEUMS STOOD ON THE COSMOPOLITAN-NATIONAL CONTINUUM WAS, IN PART, DETERMINED BY ITS CITY'S CULTURAL ARMATURE - THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL POLICIES IN PLACE, ITS HISTORY, AND THE CHARACTER AND VALUES UNDERGIRDING ITS LONG-STANDING INSTITUTIONS. THIS ARMATURE
reflected deep cultural structures — how old ways of thinking and doing still leave their traces in the bricks and mortar of today. For example, deeply held convictions about community, equality or the collective good do not disappear but continuously echo in the ways museums operate. They continue to influence what is displayed and what is invisible, what is spoken about and what is silenced.

A key piece of this cultural armature is the urban and national diversity management regime (which are not always the same). By that I mean, if and how diversity gets talked about; the categories, labels and metrics used to discuss and regulate it; whether diversity and immigration are seen as opportunities or problems; and what policies are put in place to enhance or remediate it as a result. These strategies and the values they reflect strongly affect what cultural institutions do. For example, in the United States many people claim a hyphenated identity (i.e. Chinese-American, Indian-American, etc). Embracing their Irish, Indian or Chinese ancestry does not discount the American side of their attachment. In fact, some argue that that is what it means to be an American. This ability to openly declare one’s ancestry, and the belief that it empowers rather than marginalises the individual and group, is mirrored in the cultural institutional landscape. The Museum of the American Indian, the National Museum of African American History, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the National Museum of Women in the Arts, are all institutions on the National Mall in Washington, DC which tell a specific group’s story. They are represented but set apart — a separate but equal strategy that can let encyclopaedic institutions off the hook because the Native American or African American story is ‘already taken care of’.

In contrast, the same labels that are believed to encourage inclusion in the US context are seen as socially marginalising in Scandinavia. Few people would publicly identify as an Iraqi-Dane or a Pakistani-Swede because these labels, rather than empowering, are seen as limiting social mobility and integration. Therefore, few museums in the region are dedicated to the experiences of particular groups and issues of ethnic and racial diversity are seldom highlighted.

A second factor influencing how cultural institutions create national and global citizens is a city’s position in the global cultural hierarchy. Just as countries are ranked politically and economically, so they are ranked culturally. More and more, forces at work beyond national borders shape the objects that museums put on display, the administrators and curators who make these choices, the strategies and techniques they use, and the visitors crossing their thresholds. The position and strength of a city’s embeddedness within this transnational social field affects how much it influences and is influenced by what I call global museum assemblages.

Assemblages are clusters of people, technology, objects and knowledge, which circulate through the social fields that museums inhabit, coming together in different constellations depending on where they land. These assemblages include changing repertoires of displaying, seeing, educating and organizing objects that are vernacularised differently depending upon where they land. The Masters Degree in Fine Arts, Museum Education or Curatorial Studies programmes offered around the world are part of this assemblage. It is constituted by the gift shops, gourmet restaurants and blockbuster exhibits that are now a standard part of the museum visit. It seeps into the stone of iconic museum buildings, designed by a select group of ‘starchitects’ whose work features prominently on many continents. It is regulated by institutions of global governance, like the International Council of Museums. A transnational class of museum directors, administrators, curators and educators, some of whom circulate regionally, if not globally, form part of these assemblages but also carry pieces of it in their laptops, suitcases and portfolios each time they move from post to post.

Finally, where museums fall on the cosmopolitan-nationalism continuum is influenced by how cities and nations understand their historical position on the global stage and what their aspirations are for the future. How far a nation is along the road to consolidation and towards achieving its goals for regional and/or global prominence also strongly affects what its cultural institutions display.

Let me try to make this more concrete by offering a few brief examples. The Swedish museums I studied were the farthest towards the cosmopolitan side of the cosmopolitan-nationalism continuum. This was because Sweden has historically played a more prominent regional role than Denmark and has seen itself, and its social welfare system, as a moral example for the rest of the world. Former Prime Minister Olaf Palme proclaimed long ago that solidarity does not stop at national borders. But embracing the global is also a way for Swedish museums to sidestep the national. Putting the nation on display would force Sweden to deal with events in its
history it would rather ignore, such as its activities during World War II, its eugenic experiments, and its treatment of the Sami. The nation’s internal diversity is also only quietly showcased because the national diversity management regime holds that ethnic and racial labels lead to greater social exclusion.

New York’s museums were more likely to highlight internal diversity and, increasingly so, because of the growing recognition that the people inside museums do not look enough like the people outside them. In fact, several museums, like El Museo del Barrio in Manhattan, are dedicated to the experiences of particular groups. At the Queens Museum the immigrant experience is also front and centre. The former director, Tom Finkelpearl, who is now the Commissioner of Cultural Affairs for New York City, believed that just as libraries provide resources to their users, museums should too. The museum offers English language classes, programmes for autistic children and film showings for the LGBTQ community, and will soon house a branch of the Queens Public Library.

The Queens Museum also forges relationships with the artistic and cultural communities from which its potential visitors come. One project involved an Ecuadorian artist who made an installation working with Ecuadorian truck drivers who park nearby. Since many were undocumented and could not visit their families, she helped them write ‘video letters’ to send home, which the museum then showed publicly. Thus began a series of curatorial exchanges, artistic projects and public programmes. ‘I always joke’, said Prerana Reddy, Director of Public Programs, ‘that there might be more people in Ecuador who know about this museum than there are in Brooklyn.’

Museums in New York, however, while more cosmopolitan-oriented than their Boston counterparts, are not as global as their Swedish counterparts. In the nineteenth century, New Yorkers believed it was their God-given right to become the cultural capital of the world, just as it was the nation’s manifest destiny to expand westward. Political hubris and cultural hubris go hand and hand. Because of its prominent economic and political status, many Americans came to equate globalisation with Americanisation – the world should come to the US rather than the other way around. In most museum narratives in the Northeastern US, therefore, the national, rather than the global, lay at the heart of the story.

Finally, in Doha, where twelve to sixteen museums were on the drawing board as I did my fieldwork, all museums tell a national and global story at the same time. The Museum of Islamic Art, for example, says to Qataris that they are part of a deep, rich culture that extends back centuries and across continents. It also tells visiting tourists and businesspeople that this is an important country, capable of creating a world-class museum, in a world-class building, with a world-class collection of Islamic art. It is a country that is cosmopolitan on its own terms, taking what is culturally compatible with Islam from the West, such as tolerance, critical thinking and creativity, and rejecting human rights and gender equality, which go against the national grain.

In this context, however, citizenship means everything and nothing. Qatari citizens, who make up only about 12 per cent of the country’s residents, are entitled to free education, land and an estimated income of US$87,000 per year. They do not pay taxes. Non-citizens fall into two broad camps: elite professionals brought in to help Qatar realise its social and economic vision, and the hundreds of thousands of construction workers, taxi drivers, nannies and maids that build and staff it (Human Rights Watch 2008; Fromherz 2011; Kamrava 2013). Non-citizens enjoy few rights and protections; many work under difficult, if not deplorable, conditions. So while citizenship means everything, it also means very little – theoretical displays of citizenship are far removed from its actual exercise.

In sum, the ways in which museums in New York, Stockholm and Doha displayed the internal diversity of the nation and its place in the world varied, in part, because of the cultural armature of each city, its position in the world’s cultural ranking, and its nation-building and world-claiming stage. To be sure, what happens inside museums is not going to solve the problems of unequal political membership and voice. But museums, and cultural institutions in general, can aid the struggle. They can shift how people understand different forms of citizenship, help them embrace their rights and responsibilities to both national and global communities, and showcase the permanently impermanent who are too often invisible. They can provide spaces for finding common ground, for renegotiating the national self-portrait and for convening difficult conversations. Indeed, it is their responsibility to do so.

But what next? Once we understand that nations are transnationally constituted and that permanent settlement with full rights is increasingly uncommon, how and where do we go from here?
4. Transnational social protection

Imagine the following: an undocumented Mexican migrant in Denver, Colorado, unable to access the US healthcare system takes her child to the Mexican consulate in Denver to be vaccinated so she can enroll in a US public school. A young German family, struggling to care for elderly grandparents given the retrenchment of state-supported welfare, hires a low-wage Filipino migrant to provide elder care in their home. The Filipino migrant in turn sends her wages back to the Philippines to protect and provide for her family in the spaces where the Filipino state’s welfare programmes fall short. An Indonesian construction worker in Australia cannot access social security or public health services while in Australia, although he receives the portion he was required to pay into the system when he returns home.

The dilemmas raised by these vignettes are also produced by a world on the move. They hint at the ways in which mobile families, with all combinations of full and partial membership, piece together social protections by using resources from multiple levels and sites of governance. In this next section, I suggest a framework for conceptualising and mapping these arrangements. I draw on work I’m doing in partnership with my colleagues at the Transnational Studies Initiative at Harvard University (Levitt et al. 2016).2

Our work focuses on how people on the move (whether they be documented or undocumented, voluntary or forced, permanent, short-term/seasonal, or circulating) are protected and provided for. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) designates the following categories as basic ‘social protections’ to which all should have access: pensions, unemployment insurance, survivor benefits, disability, family and child care, health, job training, and housing. To these, we add education to capture the growing number of bi-national teacher training, student retention, and reciprocal credentialing schemes being put in place. We also add, under the category of labour, the efforts of states and NGOs, such as unions, to protect worker safety and guarantee certain basic rights.

We identify four possible sources of protection. States provide social protections through a range of institutions that operate sub-nationally, nationally or supranationally. Markets provide social protections such as private health insurance or contracted childcare to those who can afford them. Third sector organizations, including NGOs, church groups, and labor unions, often provide low-cost protections including healthcare, employment training, education, housing, and more. Individual social ties include networks of family, friends, neighbours, co-workers and others upon whom individuals call to help with housing, childcare or finding work.

We define ‘transnational social protection’ as the policies, programs, people, organisations and institutions that provide for and protect programmes in the above areas in a transnational manner. Our main focus is on social protections for mobile individuals, but non-migrants and refugees also benefit from these policies and programmes. We include grounded actors that provide for and protect people who move transnationally, transnational actors that provide for and protect grounded individuals, and transnational actors that provide for and protect transnational individuals.

Migrants clearly move between spaces where the strength and breadth of the state and the footprint of the rule of law varies considerably. In countries in the global north, there is likely to be some kind of state-provided social safety net for citizens and documented migrants, although we are witnessing a period of serious cutbacks and these vary considerably in different sub-national jurisdictions (Bossert 1998; Holzmann et al. 2005; Avato et al. 2010). In the global south, where the state is often weaker, under-funded or effectively non-existent, and the rule of law only weakly established, NGOs and individual and community social networks are likely to be the primary sources of social protection. In fact, it is non-migrants in Ghana who often help their relatives through economic downturns in the Netherlands by providing financial support (Mazzucato 2011). There are also increasing numbers of examples where sending states step in to care for emigrants by providing services they cannot access in their countries of settlement. For example, as described earlier, the Mexican government offers healthcare to emigrants who cannot afford to purchase it at mobile clinics located in its consular offices.

We suggest the concept of a ‘resource environment’ to help scholars map, analyse and understand the rapidly transforming world of transnational social protections (TSP) and how access to TSP varies over time, through space and across individuals. An individual’s resource environment is constituted from a combination of all the possible protections available to him or her from our
four potential sources (states, markets, ‘third sector’, and social networks). The cluster of protections that is ultimately available depends upon the nature of the market, the strength and capacity of sending and receiving states, the third sector organisational ecology (i.e. the number and types of organisations, what they do, and their capacity to provide), and the characteristics of individual migrants and their families. An individual’s resource environment may change as they move across different sub-state or state environments, as their legal or economic status changes, and as their social networks transform.

While the logic of coverage in receiving states tends to be administered and regulated at the nation level, in many countries, particularly those with highly decentralised political systems, access and benefits vary considerably across states and regions. In the US and in Spain, for example, sub-national and local jurisdictions have a great deal of discretion with respect to migrant coverage (Dobbs and Levitt 2016). Migrants’ access to public systems of health insurance and healthcare provision, schooling, social welfare and pensions largely depends on place of residence and legal status. Therefore an undocumented Mexican migrant from Puebla who settles in New York City will have access to a package of resources and benefits based on what he/she is eligible for in his/her village of birth, as a resident of the state of Puebla and as a Mexican national, as well as the services offered by New York City, New York State and the US. His or her resource environment will differ markedly from a similarly undocumented Mexican counterpart from Zacatecas who moves to Los Angeles, because the services provided at each level of governance, in each country, are not equal (Dobbs and Levitt 2016).

Furthermore, a Mexican immigrant with similar levels of education, skills and language capabilities who moves to Wyoming faces a different set of challenges. As I already noted, her resource environment will differ because of the very different US and Mexican federal, state and city-level government benefits provided to immigrants and non-migrants. But it will also differ because the third sector is much more developed in Los Angeles and New York than it is in a new destination such as Wyoming. The strength of the labour market in each locale will also be different, such that varying numbers and types of employers will be more or less amenable to hiring undocumented workers and to offering benefits.

Finally, that migrants would be more visible in Wyoming than in New York City or Los Angeles, for example, may make it more dangerous for them to access resources even when they are available (Schmalzbauer 2014).

Let me now offer several illustrations to make these ideas clearer. Consider the resource environment of a female college-educated, employed Swedish citizen residing in Sweden. This particular individual has access to a wide array of social protections from the state, including affordable childcare, paid parental leave, excellent schools, old age pensions, and so on. Given her education and employment, she is also probably in a position to buy additional protections from companies in the private market, to access benefits from third sector organisations, and to avail herself of supports provided by family and friends. Her resource environment is largely found within her nation state, and she has little difficulty meeting her needs, even in emergency situations or medical crises.

Now let’s compare the resource environment of a similar female college-educated, employed US citizen residing in the US. The resources available from the state have shrunk in comparison to Sweden and the market becomes a bigger factor in covering needed protections, precisely because the state is a less important provider and protector than in Sweden and because this individual can afford to purchase care from the private market. This individual is also able to secure support from the third sector and from personal social ties. For example, when an elderly parent becomes ill and homebound, this person can rely on the state’s Medicare programme to cover health costs, she may purchase additional pharmaceutical insurance coverage from the market, and she may also access not-for-profit organisations working with the elderly to support her parents with home visits and other forms of emotional assistance.

If we were next to imagine the resource environment of a female US citizen living below the poverty line, her resource environment would again differ. In this case, the state would offer additional (means-tested) social protections, while the market would offer fewer. Instead, she would most likely rely on social protections provided by third sector actors (humanitarian NGOs, food banks, charitable organisations, etc.) and on informal social support from social networks of friends, family members, neighbours and co-workers.
PART I: WHAT HAS CHANGED?

What motivates this research agenda is that, more and more, each of the four sources of protection, which constitute resource environments, cross borders. Now let’s imagine a female Mexican citizen who currently lives in Los Angeles without documentation from the US government. She works in the informal economy, cleaning houses and preparing traditional Mexican foods to sell to Mexican construction workers at their work sites. Due to her undocumented status, she has no access to social protection provided by the US federal government, nor does she make enough money to purchase protections from the US market.

California, however, along with Hawaii, Washington, New York and Minnesota, offers public benefits to ‘non-qualified’ (as determined by federal law) immigrants (Fortuny and Chaudry 2011). It stands out as the US state which has moved most aggressively to extend publicly funded health coverage to immigrants with and without documents. Therefore, our hypothetical individual can apply for Covered California, a publicly subsidised, state-backed healthcare programme. Although undocumented immigrants are technically ineligible for this programme, the application process may determine that they are eligible for Medi-Cal, the state healthcare programme for low-income residents. Medi-Cal coverage for undocumented immigrants is not comprehensive. It is generally limited to prenatal care, emergency services, and long-term care services.

Our hypothetical subject can also access some social protections from the Mexican government. The Mexican government created the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME or Institute of Mexicans Abroad) to serve emigrants. The migrant can access an array of civic, health, education and financial services from the Mexican state through its programmes. Moreover, if she returns to Mexico when she retires, she will also be insured by the Seguro Popular (Popular Insurance) system in Mexico (although she cannot access these supports while living in the US unless she travels back to Mexico). This individual has also purchased a form of social protection from the Mexican market; she invested in a property in her home community where she will live when she retires.

Nevertheless, most of this migrant’s social protection in the US is derived not from states or markets but from social ties and third sector support. Her California church has a food pantry which she accesses when work is hard to find and she does not have money for meals. She also takes free English classes offered by a migrant-support NGO operating in their Los Angeles neighbourhood. And she relies heavily on family and friends in Los Angeles to provide temporary housing, credit and job references. Meanwhile, her son lives in Mexico, so she relies on social ties in Mexico (specifically to her mother) to raise him in her absence. Her child’s social protections are also increasingly transnational, even though he has never left her home village. He relies on the Mexican state for healthcare and market-based supports paid for by remittances from his mother. Moreover, the child benefits from an early-education intervention programme provided by a local Mexican not-for-profit organization but funded by a grant from the Netherlands.

Three things stand out about this woman’s experience. First, rather than having most of her needs provided by one, nationally-bound source, she must piece together social protection for herself and her family from a large number of disparate, informal and transnational sources. Second, none of the possible social protection sources from which she draws can on its own cover her major social protection needs. Third, the largely transnational sources on which this migrant relies are in no way contractually guaranteed, thus are relatively unreliable and ephemeral. Whereas laws contractually oblige states to provide for citizens, and whereas market forces ensure that most purchased protections will be provided, there is no such security for those who rely primarily on social ties and third sector organisations, each of which can withdraw their resources at any time and without recourse for the migrant and her transnational family.

Let me now make this more concrete by offering a few empirical examples.

LABOUR

Since so many people move to find work, it is not surprising that transnational schemes have been put in place to protect migrant workers, who are often more vulnerable to economic and physical abuse than workers with citizenship. In some cases, extending
transnational social protections to workers gives rise to new legal statuses that broaden existing protections to include new categories of migrants. For instance, New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employers Scheme started in 2006 to offset shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries by bringing in temporary workers, but also by curbing “labor and immigration violations through the expansion of regular labor migration avenues” (International Organization for Migration 2015). More than 100 New Zealand firms registered with this programme which hires 8,000 workers from Pacific Island countries annually. As documented migrants, seasonal workers entering New Zealand even for a few short months are entitled to regular work protections including minimum wage, paid public holidays, sick leave, workplace safety training, and accident compensation.

In cases where labour migrants are not afforded sufficient social and legal protections in host countries, sending countries often step in. Saudi Arabia is particularly notorious for failing to extend basic rights and services to the more than 1.5 million migrant domestic workers, largely from Asia, who work within its borders. Domestic workers are subject to harsh and often violent treatment by their employers, who control their passports and prevent them from communicating with the outside world. When accused of crimes, domestic workers enter a hostile legal environment where they may not have access to translators or basic legal services even if they face execution (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2008). Such circumstances led Indonesia to institute an extreme measure of social protection for its citizens: a total ban on migration to Saudi Arabia to perform domestic labour. The ban was lifted in 2014 following the successful negotiation of an agreement between the Indonesian and Saudi governments which guarantees Indonesian domestic workers the right to monthly pay, time off, the ability to communicate with their families, and to retain their passports (‘Indonesian maids get Saudi rights’ 2014).

While the Filipino government does not prohibit its citizens from leaving, it is also one of the governments most actively involved with its citizens abroad through the efforts of private, public and third sector actors. This is important because workers are one of the country’s biggest ‘exports’ and the government relies heavily on the remittances they send home. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) is responsible for processing workers’ contracts and pre-deployment checks, as well as for licensing, regulating and monitoring private recruitment agencies. Because demand is so high, thousands of licensed and unlicensed recruitment agencies are also active in the market. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is responsible for migrants and their non-migrant family members once they leave the country, providing programmes and services to permanent emigrants. Taken together, this package of services is one of the most comprehensive in Asia, extending from pre-departure to return and reintegration.

Despite these efforts, excessive placement fees, not paying or withholding wages, and deplorable or dangerous working conditions are still all too common, particularly among women. In response, the Philippines was also the first Asian nation to pass a law to ‘establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress’ (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, 1995). Some of its provisions include: (1) only sending workers to countries where certain basic standards are met; (2) assisting overseas Filipinos with their legal problems; (3) providing advisory/information, repatriation and reintegration services; and (4) protecting ‘the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the Filipino abroad’.

NGOs and INgos are also active in the fields of workers’ rights. In 2012, strikes by foreign workers in Singapore over unacceptable living conditions led to the creation of the Dormitory Association of Singapore. It works to improve the welfare of the more than one million migrants working in the construction, shipping, manufacturing and service industries in Singapore and sets minimum standards for their living accommodation (http://foreignworker-dormitory.com/).

**Senior Care**

Due to its rapid demographic transition, the high cost of labour and labour shortages, Germany has become a leader in outsourcing care for the elderly. Even though long-term care insurance has been mandatory in Germany since 1995, it is still too expensive for many families. Therefore, caring for the elderly in the long-term
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care facilities of neighbouring countries with lower labour costs, such as Poland, Slovakia or the Czech Republic, is a more attractive option. In 2012, about 7,000 German pensioners were living in facilities abroad. Countries like Spain and Thailand are also becoming increasingly popular destinations (Connolly 2012; Deutsche Rentner 2014; Schlötzer 2014).

Private companies developed transnational models for long-term care in the 2000s, most commonly in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. For example, companies from Germany and other 'Western' European countries began to build new senior care homes across their national borders, particularly in the Visegrád nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). The senior care facilities built in the Visegrád offer German-language services for German or Austrian nationals at lower rates than these individuals could find in their home nations. Local senior care companies within the Visegrád nations, seeing an opportunity for economic growth, increasingly moved into the high-end sector targeting German and Austrian citizens, sometimes renovating old care facilities with support from the European Union and then opening them for the lucrative foreign clientele. At the same time, the Visegrád nations experienced an increased demand for senior care from their own citizens, as labour migration and the demographic transition undermined the traditional, family-based model of senior care, and as available senior care homes targeting foreigners were priced out of their reach. Since Visegrád citizens can often not afford the local senior care homes created for foreign clients, local frms are developing transnational care approaches of their own. Specifically, they are building senior care homes for Visegrád citizens in bordering nations with even cheaper labour forces, like the Ukraine. In sum, the underfinanced German care sector facilitates the import of net-payers in its social security system (young immigrants who come to Germany to provide elder care), and the export of net-users (the elderly) into the neighbouring Visegrád states' facilities. The Visegrád states increasingly provide care for the relatively wealthy seniors of their Western neighbours, while exporting their own senior citizens to homes across their Eastern borders. Public debate about this issues has been highly emotional, with one German social rights organisation calling the export of the elderly a 'deportation' (Connolly 2012; Deutsche Rentner 2014; Cohen 2015).

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REIMAGINING THE NATION

These European dynamics reflect broader global trends as baby-boomers around the world reach pension age and need long-term care. Singapore is also outsourcing elderly care to Malaysia where private investors are exploring underdeveloped markets (Shohert 2013). Similarly, US senior citizens are moving to Mexico to retire, where the costs of living and long-term care are much lower than in the US. While Medicare benefits are not accessible outside of the US, there are increasing demands that the programme be extended across borders (Blahnik 1999; Paxson 2012).

5. Conclusion

More and more people choose or are pushed into living lives that cross borders - earning livelihoods, raising their political voices, caring for family members, and saving for retirement in more than one nation state. They will call many places home - the scattered sites where their dispersed family members live, where they work or study, the places they remember and dream of, and the homes they long to return to and rebuild. Their movements diversify societies that still insist that they are not diverse, bringing languages, faiths, traditions and histories into daily contact. They also produce levels of political stratification previously unknown. When large numbers push or choose to settle without integration, without full rights or voice, which states, at which levels of governance, will protect them is up for grabs.

This chapter extends the conversation about these developments in two ways. First, I call attention to the relationship between migrating people and migrating culture and argue for the power of culture as an underutilised tool for coming to terms with the challenges migration raises. Museums are just one type of cultural institution which shifts the discursive backdrop against which discussions about nationhood, citizenship and identity take place. They can interject new understandings and framings which push debates forward in unexpectedly positive ways. They can also, just as easily, reinforce power dynamics, narrowing the frame rather than expanding it. Either way, at some fundamental level, ameliorating cultural inequality by making visible cultural producers and products from certain parts of the world, and calling into question the skewed categories that sanctify certain products and disregard others, is a precursor to eliminating political and economic inequality. They are, I believe, two sides of the same coin.
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Second, I propose new ways to think about social protection in contexts of permanent impermanence and partial membership. Despite pockets of institutional change, the provision of social protection, and the policymaking that undergirds it, remains largely confined to the nation. This is out of sync with how family life is lived, livelihoods are earned, and political voice is exercised.

Rethinking social protection transnationally, and mapping how individuals and households construct resource environments, is an important next step. What it looks like so far, based on our initial foray, is that a patchwork quilt of rights and protections – sewn together using sending and receiving country resources and actors, that is sometimes luxuriously fluffy or often ridden by holes – is created. Inequality is not being eradicated but simply rearranged. The responsibility for social protection and provision is offloaded by states onto private, third sector actors or family members and friends. This is not the automatic outcome but safeguards must be put in place to make sure that states still fulfill their end of the social contract.

Despite the current climate of nationalism and protectionism in the US and Europe, globalisation will not disappear, and transnational migration will remain an inevitable aspect of our world. Even if the new US president manages to build the Great Wall of Trump or the European Union succeeds in closing its borders, it will not stem the large numbers of migrants and refugees who will live without full rights or voice. In fact, it is likely that more and more people will choose or be forced to migrate. The sooner we come to terms with that the better the situation will be, or can be, for everyone.

Notes

1. The ideas which are very briefly summarised in this section are developed more fully in my book, Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and the World on Display (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015).
2. Our team also includes Jocelyn Viterna, Charlotte Lloyd, Armin Mueller, Sonia Parella, Alisa Petroff and Simone Castellani.
3. Undocumented immigrants are eligible for Medi-Cal, and legal non-citizen residents do not have to meet the five-year eligibility requirements required for federal benefits programmes.
4. Such facilities include the ‘Sonnenhaus’ in Senec, Slovakia, and the ‘Gemütlichkeit’ in Galanta, Slovakia.
Settlers or Movers?
The Temporality of Past Migrations, Political Inaction and its Consequences, 1945–1985
Jozefien De Bock

1. Introduction

Historically, those societies with the longest tradition of multicultural policies, Canada and Australia, are settler societies. This does not mean that all immigrants who ever set foot there also settled permanently. During the nineteenth century, between a quarter and a third of European migrants overseas eventually returned to their countries of origin (Harper 2005). It does mean however that these countries expected most of their immigrants to stay and therefore focused on the development of policies aimed at the permanent settlement of newcomers. Temporary labour migration programmes were never as important there as they have been for example in Europe, especially in the period after World War II, when the booming economies of the European core were in dire need of labour. Labour-receiving countries set up bilateral agreements with (potential) sending countries on both sides of the Mediterranean with a view to temporarily importing workers (Messina 2007: 23). The immigrants who moved in the framework of these agreements came to be known as ‘guest workers’. Derived from the German ‘Gastarbeiter’, this concept clearly indicated that they were not meant to settle.

Even though some countries like France and Belgium did encourage a longer-term settlement of guest workers relatively early on (Martens 1976: 127–133) and local authorities in all receiving